

Khrushchev is right in predicting that communism is sweeping the world and that, short of war, we have no means of stopping it.

They are like the man who, as an experienced diplomat once put it many years ago, is so worried that he will fall off the top floor of the Empire State Building that he stops the elevator and jumps out of the ninth floor window. I believe this defeatism to be profoundly mistaken and unwarranted. It is based on a misreading and a misunderstanding of what has happened since the second World War and what is happening now. The root of the error is to equate, instead of to differentiate, between the Communist movement which owes allegiance to Moscow and Peiping and the worldwide movements of social reform and social revolution, which almost everywhere seek national independence and nonalignment with the great powers.

Mr. Khrushchev's hope and belief is that he will lead and direct all the reforming and revolutionary movements. We play right into his hands when we identify ourselves with the opponents of change rather than with the leaders of change.

For those who think that Laos and Southeast Asia are gone and that like the dominoes all the Asian nations and the Pacific will go too, I should like to call attention to Egypt. It was not so many years ago—in fact it was in 1955—when we were told that Egypt and Syria and Iraq, and all the oil of the Persian Gulf, and the Suez Canal, were gone or going. Egypt had gotten arms from Czechoslovakia, it got Soviet help in building the Aswan Dam, it nationalized the Suez Canal, and all was lost.

Yet look at it now. Syria and Iraq and the Persian Gulf States are not Communist. Egypt continues to put its Communists in jail. Mr. Khrushchev has attacked Egypt publicly. President Nasser is calling a congress of the neutrals who do not take their direction from Moscow. Egypt has played a decisive part in preventing the flow of Soviet arms to the rebels in the Congo.

After Egypt and the Middle East, look at Africa, look at Guinea, which 6 months ago was written off as gone. It is not gone despite the several hundred Soviet technicians who are there. Probably it is not gone in part at least because the Soviet technicians who are there have made themselves so unpopular. In any event the chances are good that Guinea in the end will line up with the rest of independent Africa as a neutral state.

There is now a great likelihood that the whole of North Africa, all the way from Morocco to Egypt, will take a neutral line, refusing to be dominated by Moscow or to take direction from Paris or Washington.

Moreover, I do not believe that Cuba is gone, and I have a very strong impression that Mr. Khrushchev does not begin to think Cuba is as gone as, let us say, Senator SMATHERS thinks it is. For Cuba is as far from Moscow as Laos is from Washington. In time, not necessarily in a very long time, the Cuban revolution will rejoin the community of American states. It will do this because it has no other place to go.

The wave of the future is not Communist domination of the world. The wave of the future is social reform and social revolution driving toward the goal of national independence and equality of personal status. In this historical tendency Mr. Khrushchev will be, as Mr. Alsop tells us he is supposed to have described himself, "the locomotive of history," only if we set ourselves up to be the roadblocks of history.

What is the lesson of all these experiences? At bottom the lesson is that there is, as the President said the other day, a worldwide social upheaval which the Communists did not create but which they hope to capture. If we make our own policy one of opposition to this worldwide movement of social

change, we shall lose the cold war and Mr. Khrushchev's hopes will be realized. If, on the other hand, we befriend and support with active measures the movements of social change, their leaders will not submit to Moscow because they do not have to submit to Moscow. They do not wish to submit to Moscow because what they want is independence.

#### SOME REFLECTIONS UPON RECENT EVENTS AND CONTINUING PROBLEMS

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Madam President, for the past 2 months the attention of the world has been engaged by a series of dramatic events. In their wake, a great many Americans have been left shocked, confused, and frustrated by unmistakable blows to the prestige of the United States. First, a Soviet flier orbited the earth in a space vehicle. Then came the misadventure in Cuba. This was quickly followed by a further decline in the Laos situation, which has set the stage for what may be an unhappy denouement to that affair.

On the heels of these events, there has emerged another Berlin crisis, one that probably is more serious than any of its predecessors. I do not now intend to explore the elements of the Berlin situation. It is at this moment under the most serious study by this Government and our European allies.

My fear is that many Americans, including some whose judgment is generally good, are drawing the wrong conclusions from the earlier events I mentioned. From the Soviet space achievement, they conclude that we must dramatically expand our man-in-space program, whatever the cost. The lesson of Cuba, they suggest, is that the objective was the correct one, but that the means employed were inadequate. And they further suggest that any means by which we can block Communist encroachment in our hemispheric garden is the proper course of action. From the events in Laos, many of these voices argue that a political settlement in the present circumstances will simply yield up another country to communism; that we must prevent with any available means the formation in Laos of a government that includes Communist participation.

What these voices are saying is that the United States is the strongest country in the world, and should not hesitate to commit its strength to the active defense of its policies anywhere outside the Communist empire. This is dangerous doctrine; nothing would please Communist leaders more than to draw the United States into costly commitments of its resources to peripheral struggles in which the principal Communist powers are not themselves directly involved.

As a Nation, we are understandably prone to be more responsive to dramatic events than to the hard, continuing struggle itself. This is a susceptibility that is common to free societies, but much less a problem to totalitarian societies. As a Nation, we are a ruggedly pragmatic people, accustomed to disposing of problems swiftly and resolute-

ly. Yet it may be that the simple trial and error methods that accompanied our growth are not relevant to our present role as defenders of Western civilization.

As leader, we must recognize that the struggle with our Communist adversary has entered a critical phase. Our position has been steadily receding over the past several years. We can no longer afford errors. Henceforth, we must endow our actions with greater wisdom, judgment, and consistency than has been the case in recent years. This is a large order. We are caught up in a swirl of events. Wisdom and judgment derive from reflective thought. It is difficult to bring these qualities to bear on events that often develop with bewildering speed. The answer, of course, is policy. We must develop policies against which we can properly evaluate our initiatives and our responses to critical events. We must also develop style. It is one thing to enunciate policies, and another to make them credible. It is style, our performance as a Nation and a great power, that determines the credibility of our policies. In the present struggle, style is as important as power. They have a 1-to-1 relationship.

Cuba, Laos, the Soviet cosmonaut—none of these by itself is a threat to our national security or to the long-term success of our policies. But by exaggerating their significance and reacting to them injudiciously we disfigure our national style and undermine our policies.

Since the end of World War II, our overall policy has been clear to us; but its outlines have occasionally been blurred in the view of others by our diplomatic performance. Our objective has been world peace, which we have tried to maintain by cooperating with many other countries and assisting the efforts of each one to find its own destiny in an atmosphere free of coercion. More specifically, we helped to preserve the independence of Greece and Turkey with timely assistance. The Marshall plan allowed each country of Western Europe to preserve its independent character, and restored the entire area to economic health.

We sought to internationalize control of the atom at a moment when we, alone, possessed the knowledge of nuclear power. This initiative was frustrated by the Soviet Union. At that moment, when we possessed a nuclear monopoly, we might have imposed our will upon the Soviet Union; but we did not. Subsequently, the pressures arising from the Soviet Union's imperialistic design induced us to form defensive alliances with other countries. As the stress of the struggle shifted from a military to an economic and social context, we intensified our efforts to enable other countries to develop strong institutions and better standards of life for their peoples. We have encouraged regional groupings. With the OECD, we have recognized the interdependence of our own economy with those of 19 countries; and we have led in creating an instrument that will enable other capital exporting countries to join with us in an effort to narrow the

gap between the rich and the poor societies of the world. We helped to create the United Nations, and we have faithfully honored our obligations and commitments to the world organization.

It is with such policies that we have sought to clarify our intentions, and to achieve our objective of peace, stability, and progress in a changing world. Many of our most vexatious problems have grown out of the occasional lapses and departures from the philosophy that has inspired our policies. Our equivocal position in the mid-1950's on the question of so-called neutralism is one example of such a lapse. The impetuous withdrawal of our support for the Aswan Dam project in Egypt is another, and has had far-reaching consequences. The massive retaliation statement was a lapse. We can point to the Cuban affair as a more recent example. In the past 10 years, we have sometimes defended what may be regarded as the indefensible—the regimes of certain anachronistic leaders whose only virtue was their anticommunism. Such gestures have harmed, not helped, our position. The point is this: We are confident that our objectives are correct and unassailable; yet our bonafides will be fully accepted by others only if and when our performance is fully consistent with these stated objectives. That is part of the burden of being a great power and a leader.

It may be that the time has come to reappraise some of our basic assumptions. Throughout much of this century many Americans assumed—wrongly—that the transgressions and affronts to world order committed by aggressive forces were none of our business. With the collapse of that assumption, a good many of us have swung in the other direction and to the opposite conclusion that we can—and should—impose our design for living upon the uncertain but aspirant societies of the world. This assumption is also illogical. However admirable our design may be, it cannot be imposed.

In the struggle with communism, there is a double standard. The Communists seek to impose their design on other countries. Their tactics most often are a brew of terror, subversion, and saturation propaganda, mixed with promises, of which a number are translated into meaningful assistance. The United States seeks not to impose its hegemony upon others, but to help others remain independent and safe from foreign domination. It is suggested with some frequency that U.S. policies would be improved by an infusion of the more mischievous tactics employed by the Communists; that with some application we could beat the Communists at their own game. This, I think, totally misses the point and the real nature of the struggle. The fact is that our greatest strength—indeed, our greatest asset in the struggle—is this double standard. Ours is a permissive system, challenged by one that is totalitarian. Our system guarantees certain basic rights to the individual, and it is these that have made the United States the focus of man's best hope for a way of life that is consistent with his quest for freedom and dignity.

It is not our affluence, or our plumbing, or our clogged freeways that grip the imagination of others. Rather, it is the values upon which our system is built. These values imply our adherence not only to liberty and individual freedom, but also to international peace, law and order, and constructive social purpose. When we depart from these values, we do so at our peril. The world, as we have come to realize, also recognizes the double standard, and demands from the United States a higher order of conduct than is expected from others. Whether this distinction will be an asset or a liability in the struggle with communism, remains to be seen. Certainly the answer rests with us. If we are faithful to our own values, while following an intelligent, courageous, and consistent line or policy, we are likely to find a high measure of the support we seek abroad. But if we fail our own values and ideals, ultimately we shall have failed ourselves.

In glancing over the shards of past civilizations, the eye pauses wistfully over the glory radiated by Periclean Athens. As if plotted by one of its own dramatists, the seed of the tragedy that befell Athens and the other city states can be traced to the highest moment of Athenian brilliance. Shortly after the start of their brief ascendancy—and well before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War—the Athenians made a distinction between themselves and those who depended on their leadership and benevolence. They denied to these others the elevated and enlightened attitudes which inspired the genius of their own society. Thus, the Athenians lost the respect and good will of those who might have supported them in the struggle against Sparta.

The highest achievements of our society are also the product of ideas first put forth in the world by these old Athenians. And as Athens was the leader of a league of city states, so is the United States the leader of a number of societies who seek primarily the continuing right to be free to choose for themselves.

Some may object that, as a practical matter, the fire spread by communism can be fought effectively only with fire. I disagree. The United States must remain strong and firm. But the United States, in order to prevail, must also help others toward the fulfillment of their own highest purposes. The United States cannot guarantee the borders of a neutral country against infiltration, or its villages from subversion. But the United States can become a pivotal force in enabling well-intentioned governments of independent countries to bring about the economic and social reforms that their societies are understandably enough insisting upon. Given such reforms, subversive efforts fail, and terrorists are unable to intimidate unsympathetic peasants and villagers backed up by alert government forces. The late President Mansaysay of the Philippines understood the elements of the problem, and in his country disposed of it decisively.

Mao Tse-tung, who directed the most stupendous of guerrilla operations, is a

high authority on the subject. In his treatise on guerrilla warfare, he wrote:

Guerrillas are like fish, and the people are the water in which the fish swim. If the temperature of the water is right, the fish multiply and flourish.

In colonial Indochina, the temperature was right; the French spent 8 years trying to defeat the Vietnamese guerrilla army. They invested \$7 billion in this war, which cost the lives of 100,000 French and Vietnamese soldiers. At one stage, the French committed a force of a half million men to the fighting. But France bore the heavy burden of its colonial record and its unconcern with political and social reform. Inevitably, France lost.

In Laos, the Communist Pathet Lao guerrillas have also found the temperature of the water agreeable. Here, however, the situation lacked the element of inevitability. Somewhat quixotically, the United States sought to make an armed anti-Communist bastion of Laos. This was a mistake. Laos is a primitive country. Most Lao are rooted in the past. Theirs is the pace of the meandering Mekong River which nourishes their lands. Most are concerned, not with an entity known as Laos, but with their families, with the life in their villages, and with their religion. They are a disarmingly gentle people, for whom conflict is disagreeable. They keenly dislike killing each other. It is likely that many more people are presently losing their lives in the terror-ridden countryside of South Vietnam each month than have died from all the strife in Laos.

I say that our policy in Laos was a mistake, because it was not related to the needs of the country or to the nature of its people and their interests. In a landlocked country of mountains, rain forests, and river delta—a country profoundly backward, even by regional standards—the United States attempted to establish an anti-Communist force in the form of an elaborately outfitted 29,000-man army and a tame government.

The situation in Laos has wobbled, ever since, between tragedy and farce. Just as there was never any pro-Communist motivation among most Lao there was no anti-Communist motivation, either. And the United States utterly failed to inspire it. The illusion that we could make a bastion of Laos cost us more than \$300 million. The cost to our prestige cannot be measured.

South Vietnam is a different case. The people are anti-Communist. That would seem to raise a question. If the temperature of the water is not right, how is it that the Communist Viet Cong guerrillas in south Vietnam have managed to gain a foothold in much of the countryside? The answer appears to rest with the regime of Vietnam's President Diem.

The regime in Vietnam has been strong in a situation where strength has been essential. It has been courageous and diligent in bringing order and economic progress out of the chaos that attended the country's birth. It can

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point to a record of steady accomplishment. Yet the regime has lacked something in benevolence and has shown impatience toward a people who have suffered a great deal. Opposition, including that of anti-Communist elements, has been vigorously suppressed. It is a regime that of necessity has been authoritarian, but one that also has been perhaps unnecessarily severe. On balance, however, it should be said that the accomplishments of this regime are overlooked by many observers and commentators, who all too frequently have accepted uncritically the most abusive gossip and propaganda circulated about President Diem and his administration.

The term "qualified success" could be used to describe the American performance in Vietnam, as well as the Diem regime. Our aid programs have enabled the country to endure and to achieve modest progress. Yet the emphasis has been too heavily weighted on the military side. If there has been any assessment by us of Vietnam's long-range economic problems—any coherent effort to measure programs against economic targets—I am not aware of it.

Ultimately, Vietnam's struggle for survival as an independent country will be determined by the economic and social progress that flow from the programs and policies of its Government. Paramilitary operations might influence, but would not determine the outcome. Neither would a costly, protracted, and inconclusive military struggle in Laos determine the outcome in Vietnam. For the United States, the proper course is to continue sustaining and supporting efforts of the Vietnamese Army to cope effectively with the foe in being—tough bands of hit-and-run Communist guerrillas—while devoting at least as much effort to assisting and guiding the Vietnamese people in their struggle for dignity and economic independence.

One of President Diem's responsible critics in the Far East is the correspondent for the French newspaper, *Le Monde*, who said last month:

Contrary to what some might believe, the Vietnamese does not pretend, at the present time, to convert the South Vietnam population to communism. This population knows too much about communism and does not like it. The Vietnamese knows this and is far less ambitious. It only tries to accomplish one thing: That Mr. Diem's government does not conquer this population or rather that it loses it, that the population completely ceases to obey him.

The obvious consequence of serious defections away from the Diem regime by the Vietnamese people would be a vacuum. This vacuum inevitably would be filled by the only other significant force in the country—the Communists.

The tempo of Communist subversion in Southeast Asia has been stepped up briskly in the past several months. We can hardly expect a respite; indeed, one can safely assume only that the struggle for independence in Southeast Asia has entered a decisive stage. The pressure will be relentless. Some countries, especially the politically nonaligned, have not yet been exposed to the weight of the problem, but they are acutely conscious of the danger.

Were I the leader of one of these countries, I would adopt the following policy toward the United States. I would repeat and clarify my determination to remain free of political alignment with either power bloc. I would seek economic and technical assistance from the United States, and remind the United States that if I choose to accept limited aid from the Communist bloc I am not unaware of communism's ultimate plans for my country. But I would discreetly point out that the United States cannot with guns, tanks, jeeps—or even with dollars—keep communism out of my country. The United States, I would add, can help me keep communism out of my country by imaginatively and dispassionately supporting my efforts to promote the welfare of my people. If communism should attack my country from without, I would call upon the United States and its allies for whatever military support they could make available. If communism should commence a campaign of terror and subversion inside my country, I would seek from the United States technical military assistance so that I might cope effectively with this Communist device. And I would seek still further direct economic assistance so that I could quicken the pace of progress in my country.

If I were one of the so-called neutralist leaders of a newly independent country, I—like most of this group—would have silently identified my hopes for the future with American leadership. And despairing of consistently wise American leadership, as I often would, I might impart this thought to my American colleagues. The Soviet revolution occurred more recently than the American. And its heirs are adroit in trimming their sails to the revolutionary winds of change around the world. Yet much of the world remembers what the American Revolution has accomplished. And the countless millions who do remember—whether in Vietnam, Iran, Cuba, or elsewhere—hope and insist that the spirit and intelligence that inspired America's revolution will animate America's foreign policy.

Earlier in these remarks, I referred to the alarming reactions of many Americans to the Cuban affair, as well as to the worsened Laotian situation. Cuba, of course, for all intents and purposes, has been transformed into a Communist oriented, totalitarian state. It is idle to expect the present Cuban regime to reform, to collapse, or to be overthrown by its exiles. And I submit that to overthrow it by American force, or by some combination including American force, would be self-defeating and would create more problems than would be solved. We often hear that the existence of a Communist regime in Cuba is intolerable to the United States. But is that really the case? I know it is embarrassing and annoying and potentially dangerous, but is it really intolerable?

The possibility of Soviet missile bases and jet aircraft bases in Cuba is frequently noted. I suppose we would all be less comfortable if the Soviets did install missile bases in Cuba, but I am not sure that our national existence would be in substantially greater danger than is the

case today. Nor do I think that such bases would substantially alter the balance of power in the world.

What would substantially alter the balance of power in the world would be precipitate action by the United States resulting in the alienation of most of Latin America, Asia and Africa.

I believe that if we intervene unilaterally in Cuba, we prejudice our cause in the hemisphere. The contrary argument by the interventionists is that if we do not intervene, we lose the hemisphere—that is, that if Cuba continues to exist as a base for Communist propaganda, subversion, and agitation, the other countries of Latin America, beginning first in Central America and the Caribbean, will gradually be subverted and overthrown.

It is quite true that, as President Kennedy said to the newspaper editors, a Communist Cuba poses greater dangers to Latin America than it does to us. My point is that the vulnerability of Latin America to communism may well be increased more by unilateral action against Cuba than by the continued existence of Castro's Cuba. One cannot honestly be dogmatic about this. The hour is very late in Latin America. Many of the free governments of that area walk a tight-rope. But the situation is not completely hopeless, nor are we completely helpless.

There is much that we can do to strengthen the cause of freedom in the Western Hemisphere, if we have the wit to do it and if we get on with the job. We have neglected the job as long as we dare.

We can act vigorously and imaginatively to implement the alliance for progress and the act of Bogota. This is a slow, long-term job, but that is all the more reason for starting at once.

We can give technical assistance in police work and countersubversive activities to the free governments of the hemisphere which request it.

We can improve the breadth and depth of our contacts with free labor groups and with the intellectual non-Communist left in Latin America.

We can give technical assistance to the progressive democratic political groups of Latin America in the techniques of political organization and action. I am becoming increasingly disturbed that this kind of activity is left so largely to the Communists, with the result that they frequently take over positions of leadership in labor unions, student organizations, and other groups.

We can take every opportunity to impress upon the governments and the people of Latin America that a Communist Cuba is a greater threat to them than it is to us, that it is not solely our problem, but also their problem, that we are not going to solve it for them at great expense to ourselves, and that they would be well advised to meet their own responsibilities in the matter.

The Organization of American States must take a broader and more active role in the affairs of the hemisphere. Within hours after the announcement of the assassination of General Trujillo, voices were heard here urging U.S. intervention. Those voices should instead have

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been reminding the Organization of American States of its responsibility. Our neighbors would quite rightly be quick to criticize a unilateral intervention by the United States in a situation such as that which occurred in the Dominican Republic.

The action of the Organization of American States in sending a fact-finding commission to the Dominican Republic is encouraging evidence that the organization is now accepting some of its hard responsibilities.

A peaceful revolution should be brought about in the Dominican Republic. The enormous properties of the late dictator should be turned over to the Dominican people to be operated for their benefit. And a moderate government based upon democratic principles should be encouraged.

The meeting in Uruguay this August of the Organization of American States offers an opportunity to give additional credibility and momentum to the alliance for progress. Few such opportunities may remain. On this and related occasions the United States must make clear that it is not seeking to cultivate complaint regimes, but rather independent and progressive societies. Our duty is to show that between communism and the flickering old order, the United States recognizes a third choice—permissive societies whose central purpose is to embody the peoples' will and the peoples' needs.

In Latin America, as in much of the rest of the world, the question is being posed: Can social and economic progress proceed apart from totalitarian discipline? It is our duty to provide a credible case for the affirmative side of this debate. Our economic and philosophical resources, if wisely used, should enable us to succeed.

## REORGANIZATION PLAN NO. 4

The Senate resumed the consideration of Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1961.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Madam President, I wish to renew my request made previously that the discussion on Reorganization Plan No. 4 be limited to 2 hours, 1 hour to be under the control of the distinguished minority leader [Mr. DIRKSEN] and 1 hour under the control of the chairman of the committee, the distinguished Senator from Arkansas [Mr. McCLELLAN], with the proviso that prior to the limitations going into effect 5 minutes will be allocated to the Senator from Idaho [Mr. CHURCH], 5 minutes to the Senator from New York [Mr. KEATING], and 5 minutes to the Senator from South Dakota [Mr. MUNDT].

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

## SPORTS ANTIRIGGING BILL

Mr. KEATING. Madam President, I introduce for appropriate reference a bill to prohibit schemes in interstate and foreign commerce to influence by bribery the outcome of sporting contests.

The bill would make a Federal crime any conspiracy in interstate commerce

which sought to influence by bribery the outcome of any sporting event. The bill would apply to players or other contest officials as well as to fixers. However, an immunity section is included to enable the Justice Department to compel testimony when necessary in the public interest. The bill provides penalties of fines of not more than \$5,000, or imprisonment for not more than 10 years, or both.

The bill contains a unique presumption section under which proof of bribery would raise a presumption that there was a scheme in interstate commerce to fix the event. There are precedents for such presumptions in other criminal statutes such as those relating to narcotics. I believe that the reasonableness of such a presumption was amply demonstrated in a recent report of the New York State Commission on Investigations showing the nationwide network relied upon by professional gamblers.

Today's gambling fraternity is not just a local operation. The bigtime bookmaker, in order to survive, must have a reliable line on the contest, which requires expert, up-to-the-minute advice, a method of layoffs to insure against financial disaster, and quick results in order to function efficiently. With so much at stake, the temptation to fix various athletic events is always present. For all of these services the bookmaker must rely upon a syndicated operation and upon many individuals outside his community.

We have all been shocked by the recent basketball scandals which are still being investigated. This is the second basketball scandal to come to light in a relatively short time. The last basketball investigation involved 23 cities, including New York, and 17 different States, and exposed score rigging deals in almost 50 college games.

The scandalous basketball fixes are imperiling intercollegiate athletics and undermining public confidence in sports. Knowing of the deep concern of the NCAA with this problem, I conferred with the association's officials on what action the Federal Government could take in this field. We all know from numerous investigations that these "fixes" are engineered by a combination of people operating without any regard to State boundaries. The use of interstate facilities makes these schemes a matter of Federal concern. We have agreed that this bill—which will supplement but not override State laws—represents the best hope for wiping out the vipers infecting our college sports. I am very happy with the cooperation and support which I have received from the NCAA. I am convinced that enactment of this measure would greatly assist in the fight against the contamination of amateur and professional sporting events by professional gamblers.

The Senate Judiciary Committee now has under consideration a number of antigambling bills, but they deal only peripherally with this problem. This bill will represent a direct attack on the evil figures who attempt to corrupt college youths and on the misguided players and others who cooperate in such schemes.

I have been encouraged by preliminary indications of strong support for this measure. I hope it will be quickly scheduled for hearings so that it can be acted upon at the same time we deal with other pending anticrime bills.

Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed at this point in the Record.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be received and appropriately referred and, without objection, the bill will be printed in the Record.

The bill (S. 2132) to amend title 18, United States Code, to prohibit schemes in interstate or foreign commerce to influence by bribery the outcome of sporting contests, and for other purposes, introduced by Mr. KEATING, was received, read twice by its title, referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, and ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,* That (a) chapter 11, United States Code (entitled "Bribery and Graft"), is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section:

"§ 224. Bribery of participants in sporting contests

"(a) Whoever carries into effect, attempts to carry into effect, or conspires with any other person to carry into effect any scheme in commerce to influence by bribery the outcome of any sporting contest, with knowledge that the purpose of such scheme is to influence by bribery the outcome of that contest, shall be fined not more than \$5,000, or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.

"(b) In any prosecution under this section—

"(1) proof that any person gave, or offered or promised to give, to any individual any valuable consideration, with intent to induce that individual (A) to refrain from participating in any sporting contest, (B) to refrain as a participant in any such contest from exerting his best effort to gain victory in that contest, or (C) to perform his duties as an official in any such contest knowingly in a manner unfair or prejudicial to any contestant in that contest, shall be prima facie proof that the person who gave, or offered or promised to give, such valuable consideration was carrying into effect a scheme in commerce to influence by bribery the outcome of that contest with knowledge of the purpose of that scheme;

"(2) proof that any individual solicited, or received or agreed to receive, from any person engaged in carrying into effect any scheme in commerce to influence by bribery the outcome of any sporting contest, any valuable consideration in exchange for the agreement or promise of that individual (A) to refrain from participating in any sporting contest, (B) to refrain as a participant in that contest from exerting his best effort to gain victory in that contest, or (C) to perform his duties as an official in that contest knowingly in a manner unfair or prejudicial to any contestant in that contest, shall be prima facie proof that such individual was engaged in a scheme in commerce to influence by bribery the outcome of that contest with knowledge of the purpose of that scheme.

"(c) Whenever in the judgment of a United States attorney the testimony of any witness, or the production of books, papers, or other evidence by any witness, in any case or proceeding before any grand jury or court of the United States involving any violation of this section, is necessary to the